In the December minutes, the staff forecast narrative was unusually specific about the long-run glidepath for inflation. Staff said tariff increases were expected to keep upward pressure on inflation through 2025 and 2026, before inflation returned to its prior disinflationary trend and “reach 2 percent in 2028.” That explicit date mattered: it anchored the staff’s baseline that the “last mile” back to 2% would be slow, but still achievable on a definable horizon.

In the January minutes, the staff’s inflation story shifts subtly. Staff now describe the inflation forecast as “slightly higher, on balance” than the one prepared for December, reflecting tighter resource utilisation and a higher projected path for core import prices. They again lean on tariffs as a key near-term driver, noting that as the effects of higher tariffs are expected to wane starting around the middle of the year, inflation is projected to return to its “previous disinflationary trend.” But the December clause , the explicit endpoint of reaching 2% in 2028, does not appear.

Why does that matter? Minutes are carefully edited documents, and the staff forecast paragraph is typically one of the more consistent sections across meetings. When a specific date drops out, it can be read as the Fed becoming less willing to pin the outlook to a calendar, especially at a time when uncertainty is described as “elevated” and risks to inflation are still seen as skewed to the upside.

This does not necessarily mean the staff have abandoned the 2% objective or even that the endpoint has shifted again. But it does suggest a preference to emphasise direction (“back to disinflation”) over deadline (“2% by X”). For markets, that kind of nuance can feed the idea that the Fed is increasingly cautious about declaring victory on the inflation path, and wary of being boxed in by its own timetable if the next phase of disinflation proves “slower and more uneven.”